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RECONCEPTUALIZING NEPA TO AVOID 
THE NEXT PREVENTABLE DISASTER 
Michael Barsa* 
David A. Dana** 
Abstract: This Article develops two accounts of why the risks of techno-
logical failure at the root of the Deepwater Horizon disaster were roundly 
ignored by regulators and industry alike. First, we argue that the inatten-
tion to risk may have reflected a “groupthink” pathology within the ho-
mogenous community of regulators and industry actors, whereby an or-
thodoxy regarding the safety of drilling came to be not just accepted but 
required in order to succeed. Second, we argue that the inattention to risk 
may have been a rational industry decision in light of its ability to avoid 
bearing all the costs of a disaster, as well as its ability to capture regulators 
to avoid unwanted scrutiny. We argue, then, that no matter which account 
was in fact prevalent, the proposed reforms in the wake of Deepwater Ho-
rizon are not fundamental enough to address the risks. Building on a con-
tractarian model, we argue for a reformulation of NEPA and other envi-
ronmental reviews whereby it would be understood that industry engages 
in these reviews as a contractual quid pro quo for obtaining valuable 
rights, such as leases, and where those rights could be rescinded when it 
becomes apparent that the reviews were not conducted reasonably and in 
good faith. In other words, we believe that industry must come to “own” 
environmental review and, once that is so, the culture and calculations of 
industry leaders will change to make them more attentive to environ-
mental risks. 
Introduction 
 There are many technical, engineering, and scientific reasons why 
the Deepwater Horizon/BP disaster occurred. This Article does not 
seek to address the proximate causes of the disaster, but instead to 
probe further back in time. Why did no one in either government or 
industry plan for such a catastrophe? Why did numerous environmental 
reviews fail to even consider an oil spill of such great magnitude? 
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 This Article begins to answer these questions by focusing on the 
relationship between the oil companies and regulators, and to place the 
failure in the context of larger debates about the role of substantive en-
vironmental law in facilitating regulatory success or failure. In particular, 
this Article considers the BP disaster from the perspective of two ac-
counts as to why the regulation of natural resource extraction often fails 
to constrain the behavior of large companies, to the detriment of the 
public welfare. The first account, which we call the “Group Pathologies” 
account, essentially attributes the failure to the tendency of groups, es-
pecially highly homogenous groups, to develop strongly held, extreme 
positions even in the face of contrary data.1 This account posits a world 
where the dominant voices in industry and government honestly, if mis-
takenly, believed that a spill of such magnitude was virtually impossible.2 
The second account, which we call the “Ruthless Calculator/Captive 
Regulator” account, instead depicts the spill as the result of BP’s ra-
tional, if ruthless, calculation that it had so captured the regulators that 
it would be able to externalize much of the cost of any environmental 
risks.3 
 In either case, we believe that a relatively straightforward reform to 
the environmental review process under the National Environmental 
Policy Act (NEPA) could significantly lessen the likelihood of such fail-
ures in the future.4 The dominant model for NEPA has been one 
where the action agency—typically a non-environmentally oriented 
agency— conducts the review and is or is not challenged in court for 
having done too little.5 Both the Group Pathologies and Ruthless Cal-
culator/Capture accounts, however, suggest that nothing will change 
unless there are much stronger and more immediate incentives to per-
form robust environmental assessments.6 Otherwise it will be too easy 
for regulators and industry to remain blinded to the risk, as in the 
Group Pathologies account, or to accept such risk knowing that many 
of the costs may be externalized onto others, as in the Ruthless Calcula-
tor/Captive Regulator account.7 
                                                                                                                      
1 See discussion infra Part II. 
2 See infra notes 92–96 and accompanying text. 
3 See discussion infra Part III. 
4 See discussion infra Part IV. 
5 See Zygmunt J.B. Plater et al., Environmental Law and Policy 320 (4th ed. 
2010). 
6 See discussion infra Part IV. 
7 See infra Part IV. 
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 In order to overcome these problems, we advocate what we call the 
NEPA-as-contract model.8 Under this model, companies that receive 
leases on the basis of grossly inadequate assessments that they them-
selves perform will potentially have their leases rescinded, much as in-
surance contracts can be rescinded if it is later discovered that the ap-
plicant for insurance made a material misstatement on his or her 
application.9 Even if the threshold for rescinding a lease were set very 
high, and even taking into account that government officials might well 
not act on their legal right to rescind, we think that, ex ante, the mere 
possibility of the loss of valuable lease rights could be enough to en-
courage more thorough and honest assessments at the time companies 
applied for lease rights.10 Importantly, this model does not require 
Congress to amend NEPA or pass new legislation, but instead may be 
incorporated into the language of the lease contracts themselves. Thus, 
unlike many other proposed reforms, this one could be implemented 
immediately for all contracts going forward, and for any existing con-
tracts subject to renegotiation.11 
I. The Deepwater Horizon/BP Permitting Process 
 For many, the disastrous Gulf of Mexico oil spill began on April 20, 
2010, with the explosion and fire on the Transocean-owned, BP-licensed 
drilling rig Deepwater Horizon. In truth, however, the spill was the cul-
mination of years of oil drilling promotion that gave short shrift to the 
environmental risks.12 
 In 2006, in the wake of rising oil prices, legislation opened up large 
areas of the Gulf of Mexico to offshore oil drilling.13 After opening 
these areas to drilling, the Minerals Management Service (MMS) en-
gaged in NEPA analysis at three different stages of development. At the 
programmatic level, MMS prepared a single Environmental Impact 
Statement (EIS) for a five-year leasing period, which covered eleven dif-
                                                                                                                      
8 See infra Part IV. 
9 See infra notes 132–136 and accompanying text. 
10 See discussion infra Part IV. 
11 See infra note 145 and accompanying text. 
12 See Tim Dickinson, The Spill, The Scandal and The President, Rolling Stone, June 24, 
2010, at 56. 
13 See Gulf of Mexico Energy Security Act, Pub. L. No. 109-432, 120 Stat. 2922, 2925 
(2006); Press Release, Sen. Salazar Will Push Legislation for Increased Oil and Gas from Gulf 
Coast Region to Ease Energy Needs ( July 6, 2006), available at http://www.biological diver- 
sity.org/programs/public_lands/energy/dirty_energy_development/oil_and_gas/salazar_oil
_and_gas_07-06-2006.html. 
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ferent lease sales, including the lease to BP.14 This EIS was, by necessity, 
done at a high level of generality. At this level of generality, MMS esti-
mated that there was over a ninety-nine percent chance that one or 
more spills of greater than 10,000 barrels would occur over the follow-
ing forty years.15 Nonetheless, when conducting its risk analysis, MMS 
considered only two categories of spills, those greater than 1000 barrels, 
and those less than 1000 barrels.16 Catastrophic spills—those far greater 
than 1000 barrels—were not independently considered.17 The most 
likely spill greater than 1000 barrels was estimated at 4600 barrels,18 less 
than one one-thousandth of the spill that eventually occurred.19 MMS 
also noted that blowouts are “rare events and of short duration,” which 
meant that, in its opinion, the “potential impacts to marine water quality 
are not expected to be significant.”20 Along these same lines, the EIS 
stated that “a subsurface blowout would have a negligible effect on [Gulf 
of Mexico] fish resources or commercial fishing.”21 
                                                                                                                     
 Despite these deficiencies, no further EIS was performed for the 
individual lease sale of the BP well. Instead, during the lease sale, MMS 
only prepared an Environmental Assessment (EA). The EA relied on 
the highly generalized EIS to state that “no new significant impacts 
were identified for proposed Lease Sale 206 that were not already as-
sessed in the Multisale EIS.”22 On that basis, MMS did not require a 
supplemental EIS, and instead issued a Finding of No New Significant 
Impact for the lease.23 
 Similarly, when it came to the actual exploration plan for the 
leased tract, no further EIS was performed. Instead, BP submitted a so-
called “Environmental Impact Analysis” as part of its exploration plan 
that did not consider the risks of a major blowout, stating that “[a] sce-
nario for a potential blowout of the well from which BP would expect 
 
14 See generally Minerals Mgmt. Serv., U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, MMS 2007-018, 
Gulf of Mexico OCS Oil and Gas Lease Sales: 2007–2012, Final Environmental Im-
pact Statement (2007) [hereinafter MMS Lease EIS]. 
15 Id. at 4-75. 
16 Id. at 4-229. 
17 Id. 
18 Id. at 4-232. 
19 Bryan Walsh, What Ever Happened to the Gulf Oil Spill?, Time (Dec. 20, 2010), http:// 
www.time.com/time/health/article/0,8599,2037876,00.html. 
20 MMS Lease EIS, supra note 14, at 4-260. 
21 Id. at 4-295. 
22 See Minerals Mgmt. Serv., U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, MMS 2007-059, Proposed 
Gulf of Mexico OCS Oil and Gas Lease Sale 206, Central Planning Area, Environ-
mental Assessment, at ii (2007). 
23 Id. 
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to have the highest volume of liquid hydrocarbons is not required for 
the operations proposed in this EP.”24 
 Such refusal to consider the effects of a blowout was consistent 
with MMS rulemaking. Specifically, the agency “decided not to impose 
any prescriptive cementing requirements,” never required an oil spill 
trajectory analysis for an underwater spill, and exempted all lessees in 
the Gulf of Mexico from the requirement to submit a blowout scenario 
as part of their exploration plans, unless they fell into one of four— 
later expanded to five—categories.25 Indeed, drilling plans in the Gulf 
of Mexico have been considered categorically exempt from NEPA 
based on an MMS manual adopted on May 27, 2004.26 Categorical ex-
clusions are “a category of actions which do not individually or cumula-
tively have a significant effect on the human environment . . . and for 
which, therefore, neither an environmental assessment nor an envi-
ronmental impact statement is required.”27 In other words, MMS con-
sidered oil drilling in the Gulf of Mexico to pose so little risk to the en-
vironment that it was not even required to assess that risk. A blowout 
was assumed to be “unlikely to have an impact based on the industry 
wide standards for using proven equipment and technology for such 
responses, implementation of BP’s Regional Oil Spill Response Plan 
which address[es] available equipment and personnel, techniques for 
containment and recovery and removal of the oil spill.”28 This was true 
despite the fact that MMS had received a number of reports, prior to 
the EIS process, concerning the reliability and effectiveness of blind 
shear rams, the supposed last “failsafe” option to prevent a blowout.29 
                                                                                                                      
 
24 BP Exploration & Production, Initial Exploration Plan, Mississippi Canyon 
Block 252, OCS-G 32306, at 2-1 (2009) [hereinafter BP Initial Exploration Plan]. 
25 Memorandum of Supplemental Information Regarding Federal Regulation of Deep-
water Drilling from Comm. on Energy & Commerce to Subcomm. on Oversight & Investiga-
tions and Subcomm. on Energy & Env’t 5–8 ( July 19, 2010) [hereinafter Energy & Com-
merce Memo], available at http://democrats.energycommerce.house.gov/documents/2010 
0719/Supplemental.Memo.Deepwater.07.19.2010.pdf 
26 See Dep’t of the Interior, No. 516 DM 15, Departmental Manual, Environ-
mental Quality Series, Part 516: National Environmental Policy Act, Chapter 15: 
Managing the NEPA Process—Minerals Management Service 15.4(C)(10) (2004), 
available at http://elips.doi.gov/app_dm/act_getfiles.cfm?relnum=3625. 
27 40 C.F.R. § 1508.4 (2010). 
28 BP Initial Exploration Plan, supra note 24, at 14-4 to -5. This was assumed to be 
true notwithstanding the fact that BP’s Regional Oil Spill Response Plan for the Gulf of 
Mexico was full of errors, listing cold water mammals such as walruses as among the sensi-
tive species in the Gulf. See BP, Regional Oil Spill Response Plan—Gulf of Mexico, at 
fig. 11-3 (2009). 
29 Energy & Commerce Memo, supra note 25, at 5 (“In the first four years of the Bush 
administration, MMS received a series of reports that identified serious concerns about the 
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 Even where safety testing was required by regulation, it was not 
performed.30 MMS regulations required companies “to submit test data 
proving that their blind shear rams could work on the specific drill pipe 
used on a well and under the pressures they would encounter.”31 How-
ever, when BP applied for its permit to drill the Macondo well, it never 
submitted this information, and Frank Patton, the engineer in the New 
Orleans office of MMS who reviewed BP’s application, never asked for 
it.32 Patton, who had spent “nearly three decades . . . working for the 
agency and the oil industry,” testified that “‘[w]hen I was in training for 
this, I was never, as far as I can recall, ever told to look for this state-
ment.’”33 While Patton testified that the blowout protector was “‘the 
most important factor in maintaining safety of the well,’” he also said 
that he’d “approved hundreds of other well permits in the gulf without 
requiring this proof” that the blind shear ram technology worked.34 
 Perhaps most damning is evidence that the agency actually altered 
environmental review documents in order to speed up approval of oil 
drilling.35 In 2006, then-MMS biologist Jeff Childs’s analysis predicted 
that a future spill in Alaska’s Beaufort Sea would be “‘likely to result in 
significant adverse effects on local [fish] populations.’”36 This finding, 
which would have forced MMS to prepare a full EIS before it could auc-
tion off a lease in the Beaufort Sea, quickly became a matter of “con-
cern” to the MMS chief of the environmental assessment section.37 It 
prompted a note from the regional supervisor for leasing and environ-
ment to the effect that this conclusion would “‘not go over well with HQ 
and others,’” and was eventually rewritten by another manager “[w]hen 
Childs balked at deleting the finding.”38 Similarly, in a 2000 draft envi-
ronmental analysis of deepwater drilling in the Gulf of Mexico, the 
agency initially wrote that “‘the oil industry’s experience base in deep-
water well control is limited’” and that a massive spill “‘could easily turn 
out to be a potential showstopper for the [Outer Continental Shelf] 
                                                                                                                      
reliability of subsea BOPs [blowout preventers] and the effectiveness of blind shear 
rams.”). 
30 David Barstow et al., Between Blast and Spill, One Last, Flawed Hope: Lax Oversight of 
Rig’s Failsafe Device, N.Y. Times, June 21, 2010, at A1. 
31 Id.; see 30 C.F.R. § 250.416(e) (2010). 
32 Barstow et al., supra note 30. 
33 Id. 
34 Id. 
35 See Juliet Eilperin, U.S. Oil Drilling Regulator Ignored Experts’ Red Flags on Environmental 
Risks, Wash. Post, May 25, 2010, at A1. 
36 Id. 
37 Id. 
38 Id. 
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program if the industry and MMS do not come together as a whole to 
prevent such an incident.’”39 But when MMS finalized the document, 
those two statements were removed, and the agency concluded that 
there was no need to prepare a full-blown EIS, except with respect to 
certain deepwater components, because “[m]ost deepwater operations 
and activities are substantially the same as those associated with conven-
tional operations and activities on the continental shelf.”40 
 In sum, the environmental review process for deepwater drilling in 
the Gulf of Mexico—and in general—appears to have been subsumed 
to the overall goal of “drill, baby, drill.”41 The review process was lax, 
categorical exclusions proliferated, risks were either ignored or excised 
from review documents, and permits were approved without the re-
quired assurances.42 What caused this confluence of failures? And what 
can be done to prevent such failures in the future? These questions are 
the subject of our analysis. 
II. A Group Pathologies Account of Regulatory Failure 
A. Groupthink 
 The failure to even consider, let alone manage, the environmental 
risks of deepwater drilling may well have proceeded from an assump-
tion that such drilling was safe. How could such an assumption have 
survived given the contrary information, in particular the series of re-
ports describing the vulnerability of the blind shear ram? Social psy-
chologists have long recognized that groups that share common as-
sumptions can be surprisingly resistant to having such assumptions 
challenged.43 
 In his famous study of failure in group decision-making, Irving 
Janis coined the term “groupthink” to refer to “a mode of thinking that 
people engage in when they are deeply involved in a cohesive in-group, 
when the members’ strivings for unanimity override their motivation to 
                                                                                                                      
39 Id. 
40 Minerals Mgmt. Serv., U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, MMS 2000-001, Gulf of 
Mexico Deepwater Operations and Activities, Environmental Assessment, at iv 
(2000); Eilperin, supra note 35. 
41 Eilperin, supra note 35; Siobhan Hughes, Steele Gives GOP Delegates New Cheer: ‘Drill, 
Baby, Drill!’, Wall St. J. (Sept. 3, 2008, 10:50 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/washwire/2008/ 
09/03/steele-gives-gop-delegates-new-cheer-drill-baby-drill/tab/article. 
42 See Eilperin, supra note 35. 
43 See Irving L. Janis, Groupthink: Psychological Studies of Policy Decisions 
and Fiascoes 5 (2d ed. 1982). 
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realistically appraise alternative courses of action.”44 Groupthink does 
not depend on invidious motives, but is exacerbated by a strong leader 
whose bias is known—a bias that the members of the group strive to 
form unanimity around.45 Lack of diversity in training and background 
also exacerbates groupthink tendencies, as does a homogenous culture 
and ideology.46 Groups subject to these factors can be impervious to 
evidence that does not conform with preconceived notions.47 
 Before applying this notion of groupthink to explain why industry 
and MMS could have been so blind to the risk of a blowout, it is worth 
noting a couple of caveats. First, the traditional groupthink model con-
cerns the actions of a discrete group given a discrete task.48 In the case 
of the BP disaster, however, there is no single discrete group that was 
blinded to the environmental risks. Indeed, it seems that all the envi-
ronmental reviews, done by either the government or industry, and all 
the disaster planning failed to consider a risk that, in hindsight, seems 
clearly like it should have been considered even if the risk was small.49 
The groupthink analysis we employ is thus in some sense larger than 
the traditional analysis, although it is in keeping with several scholars’ 
suggestion that the groupthink dynamic is actually quite common, es-
pecially in governmental decision-making.50 
 Second, it is worth noting that the explanatory power of the 
groupthink theory has been criticized in the academic literature.51 
Does groupthink cause bad outcomes? Janis’s original series of case 
                                                                                                                      
44 Irving L. Janis, Victims of Groupthink: A Psychological Study of Foreign-
Policy Decisions and Fiascoes 9 (1972). 
45 See Robert S. Baron et al., Group Process, Group Decision, Group Action 71 
(1992); Janis, supra note 44, at 197. 
46 See Janis, supra note 44, at 250; Stefan Schulz-Hardt et al., Biased Information Search in 
Group Decision Making, 78 J. Personality & Soc. Psychol. 655, 656 (2000). 
47 See Janis, supra note 44, at 37 (describing groupthink tendency of “selectively attend-
ing to the messages that feed into the members’ shared feelings of confidence and opti-
mism, disregarding those that do not”). 
48 Id. at 10 (describing the origins of groupthink research in examining “defective de-
cision[s] . . . made in a series of meetings by a few policy-makers who constituted a cohe-
sive group”). 
49 See supra text accompanying notes 20–23 (government EIS and EA process); supra 
text accompanying note 24 (BP environmental analysis). 
50 See Mark Seidenfeld, Cognitive Loafing, Social Conformity, and Judicial Review of Agency 
Rulemaking, 87 Cornell L. Rev. 486, 542–43 (2002). 
51 See Jin Nam Choi & Myung Un Kim, The Organizational Application of Groupthink and 
Its Limitations in Organizations, 84 J. Applied Psychol. 297, 302 (1999) (questioning the 
coherence of groupthink through an empirical analysis that shows some groupthink symp-
toms, such as group identity, were positively correlated to a team’s performance under 
experimental conditions). 
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studies, by focusing exclusively on foreign policy fiascoes, cannot an-
swer this question. While Janis found examples of groupthink in the 
decision-making process leading up to these fiascoes, he failed to show 
that groupthink is absent, or attenuated, in decision-making processes 
that do not lead to bad outcomes. Attempts to empirically verify the 
causal link between groupthink and bad outcomes have met with 
mixed results.52 Part of the difficulty is that Janis identified a number of 
different antecedent conditions, both in terms of the organization’s 
structure and in terms of the particular situation the organization 
faced, that would lead to groupthink.53 Laboratory research has there-
fore been made difficult because it can only include a certain number 
of variables, and therefore lacks the authenticity of a real life decision.54 
Laboratory research has also been criticized because “no consensus ex-
ists on how to appropriately operationalize some antecedents (e.g., co-
hesion)” and because “we have not yet developed reliable measures for 
many of the groupthink symptoms.”55 There is also no consensus about 
what we mean by a “bad” outcome decision. 
 Nonetheless, there is sufficient support for the notion that some 
form of groupthink leads to a predictable discounting of risks, which, 
in turn, bears some probabilistic relationship to bad outcomes, however 
they are defined.56 At a high level of generality, groupthink phenom-
ena have been observed in the failure of corporate boards to conduct 
meaningful oversight in the wake of the Enron debacle,57 the stifling of 
                                                                                                                      
 
52 See Sally Riggs Fuller & Ramon J. Aldag, Organizational Tonypandy: Lessons from a 
Quarter Century of the Groupthink Phenomenon, 73 Org. Behavior & Human Decision 
Processes 163, 166 (1998) (literature review of empirical research); Won-Woo Park, A 
Review of Research on Groupthink, 3 J. Behavioral Decision Making 229, 229–30 (1990) 
(summarizing previous empirical studies and indicating problems in those studies). 
53 See Steve Yetiv, Groupthink and the Gulf Crisis, 33 British J. Pol. Sci. 419, 421 (2003). 
Yetiv cites to Janis’s work to list four structural faults of the organization: (1) insulation of 
the group; (2) lack of traditional impartial leadership; (3) lack of norms requiring me-
thodical procedures; and (4) homogeneity of members’ social background and ideology. 
Id. He also cites to Janis’s work to identify two elements of provocative situational conflict: 
(1) high stress from external threats with low hope of a better solution than the leader’s; 
and (2) low self-esteem temporarily induced by: (a) recent failures that made members’ 
inadequacies salient; (b) excessive difficulties on current decision-making tasks lower each 
member’s sense of self-efficacy; and (c) moral dilemmas based on an apparent lack of fea-
sible alternatives except ones that violate ethical norms. Id. 
54 See Paul ‘t Hart, Irving L. Janis’ Victims of Groupthink, 12 Pol. Psychol. 247, 247–78 
(1991). 
55 See James K. Esser, Alive and Well After 25 Years: A Review of Groupthink Research, 73 
Org. Behavior & Human Decision Processes 116, 139 (1998). 
56 See Janis, supra note 44, at 37; Yetiv, supra note 53, at 437. 
57 See Jayne W. Barnard, Institutional Investors and the New Corporate Governance, 69 N.C. 
L. Rev. 1135, 1171–72 (1991); John Alan Cohan, “I Didn’t Know” and “I Was Only Doing My 
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dissent by administrative agencies,58 environmental regulation in gen-
eral,59 and the conduct of the Army Corps of Engineers before Hurri-
cane Katrina in particular.60 
 There are sufficient indicia that groupthink may have played a role 
in the discounting of environmental risks in the Gulf of Mexico. Oil 
drilling regulators and industry in the Gulf were known to be fairly 
homogenous in terms of their ideology and social background, which is 
an important factor in the development of groupthink.61 In terms of 
ideology, both industry and MMS were, in recent years, invested in in-
creasing deepwater drilling in the Gulf.62 The agency has been de-
scribed as the province of engineers who are at war with biologists who 
have counseled caution.63 As one marine biologist who left the agency 
has stated, “‘[i]n order to get promoted at MMS, you better get in-
vested in this pro-development oil culture.’”64 This ideology apparently 
did not change after the Bush Administration ended.65 “‘Employees 
describe being in Interior—not just MMS, but the other agencies—as 
                                                                                                                      
Job”: Has Corporate Governance Careened Out of Control? A Case Study of Enron’s Information 
Myopia, 40 J. Bus. Ethics 275, 282 (2002); Michael B. Dorff, Confident Uncertainty, Excessive 
Compensation & the Obama Plan, 85 Ind. L.J. 491, 515 (2010); John R. Kroger, Enron, Fraud, 
and Securities Reform: An Enron Prosecutor’s Perspective, 76 U. Colo. L. Rev. 57, 84 (2005); 
Donald C. Langevoort, The Human Nature of Corporate Boards: Law, Norms, and the Unin-
tended Consequences of Independence and Accountability, 89 Geo. L.J. 797, 810–11 (2001); Mi-
chael E. Murphy, Restoring Trust in Corporate America: Toward a Republican Theory of Corporate 
Legitimacy, 5 N.Y.U. J. L. & Bus. 415, 480 (2009); Carol A. Needham, Listening to Cassandra: 
The Difficulty of Recognizing Risks and Taking Action, 78 Fordham L. Rev. 2329, 2344–45 
(2010); Marleen A. O’Connor, The Enron Board: The Perils of Groupthink, 71 U. Cin. L. Rev. 
1233, 1237–38 (2003). 
58 See Stephen J. Choi & A.C. Pritchard, Behavioral Economics and the SEC, 56 Stan. L. 
Rev. 1, 33 (2003); Seidenfeld supra note 50, at 541; Mark Seidenfeld, Why Agencies Act: A 
Reassessment of the Ossification Critique of Judicial Review, 70 Ohio St. L.J. 251, 306–07 (2009). 
59 See Molly J. Walker Wilson, A Behavioral Critique of Command-And-Control Environ-
mental Regulation, 16 Fordham Envtl. L. Rev. 223, 224 (2005). 
60 See Daniel A. Farber et al., Reinventing Flood Control, 81 Tul. L. Rev. 1085, 1102–03 
(2007). 
61 See Office of Inspector Gen., U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, Investigative Report: 
Island Operating Company et al. 3 (2010) [hereinafter Investigative Report], available 
at http://www.doioig.gov/images/stories/reports/pdf/IslandOperatingCo.pdf; Janis, supra 
note 44, at 191–92. 
62 See Dickinson, supra note 12, at 56–57. 
63 See Eilperin, supra note 35. 
64 Dickinson, supra note 12, at 57. 
65 Id. at 56–57 (discussing President Obama’s Secretary of the Interior Ken Salazar’s 
aggressive promotion of offshore drilling). 
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the third Bush term. . . . They’re working for the same managers who 
are implementing the same policies.’”66 
 The homogeneity in both social background and ideology be-
tween MMS and oil company employees was highlighted in May 2010, 
as the BP oil spill raged, when the Interior Department’s Office of the 
Inspector General issued a report concerning MMS employees’ receiv-
ing inappropriate gifts from the Island Operating Company.67 The re-
port “found that a culture of accepting gifts from oil and gas companies 
was prevalent throughout the MMS Lake Charles office”68 in Louisiana, 
and that “the individuals involved in the fraternizing and gift ex-
change—both government and industry—have often known one an-
other since childhood.”69 The MMS Lake Charles District Manager 
Larry Williamson told Inspector General investigators that “many of 
the MMS inspectors had worked for the oil and gas industry and con-
tinued to be friends with industry representatives.”70 Williamson fur-
ther stated that “‘[w]e’re all from the same part of the country. Almost 
all of our inspectors have worked for oil companies out on these same 
platforms. They grew up in the same towns. Some of these people, 
they’ve been friends with all their life.’”71 
 The danger of such homogeneity is the lack of any credible outside 
voice that might challenge the assumptions of the group—assumptions 
such as the impact from an exploratory well blowout.72 Indeed, after the 
spill, David J. Hayes, the Deputy Secretary of the Interior, claimed in an 
interview that “‘[w]hat happened to all the stakeholders—Congress, 
environmental groups, industry, the government—all stakeholders in-
volved were lulled into a sense of what has turned out to be false secu-
rity.’”73 
 This false sense of security under the groupthink model was likely 
exacerbated by leadership that was pushing to approve oil drilling pro-
jects as quickly as possible, and that itself discounted the environmental 
                                                                                                                      
66 Id. at 58 (quoting Jeff Ruch, executive director of Public Employees for Environ-
mental Responsibility, a group that represents federal whistle-blowers). 
67 Investigative Report, supra note 61, at 1 (describing the Island Operating Com-
pany as “an oil and gas production company working on oil platforms in the Gulf of Mex-
ico”). 
68 Id. 
69 Memorandum on Investigative Report—Island Operating Company et al. from Mary 
L. Kendall, Acting Inspector Gen., Dep’t of the Interior, to Sec’y Salazar (May 24, 2010), 
available at http://www.doioig.gov/images/stories/reports/pdf/IslandOperatingCo.pdf. 
70 Investigative Report, supra note 61, at 3. 
71 Id. 
72 See Janis, supra note 44, at 39. 
73 See Barstow et al., supra note 30. 
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risks.74 For example, Vice President Cheney’s 2001 report describing the 
Bush Administration’s new energy strategy stated that “exploration and 
production from the OCS [Outer Continental Shelf] has an impressive 
environmental record” and that “delays and uncertainties can hinder 
proper energy exploration and production projects.”75 President Bush 
issued an executive order instructing agencies that “[f]or energy-related 
projects, agencies shall expedite their review of permits or take other 
actions as necessary to accelerate the completion of such projects”76 and 
Interior Secretary Gale Norton implemented royalty relief programs to 
heighten the incentives for offshore drilling.77 In light of the clear pref-
erence of leadership to emphasize more drilling, and de-emphasize en-
vironmental risks, it is no surprise that the decision-making groups re-
flected these same preferences.78 Promotional leadership is a key 
predictor of the groupthink phenomenon.79 
B. Group Polarization 
 This single-minded focus on drilling may also have led to a cogni-
tive bias related to groupthink—group polarization. Put simply, group 
polarization is the “process whereby group discussion tends to intensify 
group opinion, producing more extreme judgments among group 
members than existed before discussion.”80 This process is either due 
to an informational mechanism, where group members hear more ar-
                                                                                                                      
74 See 30 C.F.R. § 250.233 (2010) (requiring MMS to approve, disapprove, or require 
modifications of a proposed exploration plan within thirty days of submission); Seidenfeld, 
supra note 50, at 543 (finding the time pressure on agencies may exacerbate groupthink); 
Eilperin, supra note 35 (chronicling MMS’s history of pushing projects through quickly at 
all costs, even when faced with warnings of great environmental risk). 
75 Energy & Commerce Memo, supra note 25, at 3. 
76 Exec. Order No. 13,212, 3 C.F.R. 769 (2002). 
77 See Press Release, Minerals Mgmt. Serv., Dep’t of Interior, Spurred by Incentives, Oil 
and Gas Production in the Gulf of Mexico Expected to Increase Over the Next Decade 
(Nov. 15, 2004), available at http://www.boemre.gov/ooc/press/2004/press1115.htm. 
78 See Dickinson, supra note 12, at 56–57; Eilperin, supra note 35. 
79 See Noni Richardson Ahlfinger & James K. Esser, Testing the Groupthink Model: Effects of 
Promotional Leadership and Conformity Predisposition, 29 Soc. Behav. & Personality 31, 39 
(2001) (finding that “groups with promotional leaders produced more symptoms of group-
think, discussed fewer facts, and reached a decision more quickly than did groups with non-
promotional leadership”); Clark McCauley, The Nature of Social Influence in Groupthink: Compli-
ance and Internalization, 57 J. Personality & Soc. Psychol. 250, 252 (1989) (defining 
promotional leadership as “a leader who early in discussion reveals a favored policy alterna-
tive, especially in the absence of methodical procedures for generating and evaluating alter-
natives” and finding, in reviewing historical examples, that promotional leadership predicts 
occurrence of groupthink). 
80 See Baron et al., supra note 45, at 73. 
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guments for a favored outcome, or a normative one, where group 
members compete to show they share an underlying value or norm.81 
                                                                                                                     
 In the case of offshore drilling, group polarization may have only 
exacerbated the faith in technology and the discounting of environ-
mental risks, both of which were needed to assume that drilling was 
safe. Whether environmental risk was seen as a factual prediction, e.g., 
everyone knows that blowout protectors are safe, or an underlying 
value, e.g., oil drilling is good for the nation, this particular group dy-
namic may have led to a more extreme discounting of risk than would 
have been the case had the relevant personnel been working alone. 
This is especially true when group members share the same back-
ground, were trained in a similar manner, and work on similar pro-
jects.82 In that case, due to the availability heuristic,83 they are “apt to 
be facile at recalling the same types of events and therefore might all 
overestimate the probability for the occurrence of that type of event.”84 
Given the common social background and ideology described above, it 
is no surprise that everyone involved in assessing environmental risks of 
offshore drilling underestimated those risks, and overestimated the ex-
tent to which technology could overcome any blowout that did occur.85 
In light of the availability heuristic, it is also significant that deepwater 
drilling was a recent phenomenon, and that shallow-water spills, which 
would have been more familiar to the individuals involved, were less 
catastrophic and much easier to control.86 No spill comparable to the 
BP spill had ever occurred before in United States-controlled waters.87 
C. Group Confirmation Bias 
 Group confirmation bias occurs when groups “search unduly for 
information and pay too much attention to arguments that confirm 
 
81 Seidenfeld, supra note 50, at 535–36. 
82 Id. at 537. 
83 Id. at 501 (“Individuals tend to rely on the availability heuristic—the facility with 
which they can recall a type of event—as an indication of the probability that such an event 
will reoccur. The availability heuristic leads individuals to overestimate the probability of 
an event that comes easily to mind.”) 
84 Id. at 537. 
85 See supra notes 67–71 and accompanying text. 
86 See Offshore Oil Drilling in Shallow Water: Good Safety Record, Less Risky, Inst. Energy 
Res. (Oct. 21, 2010), http://www.instituteforenergyresearch.org/2010/10/21/offshore-
oil-drilling-in-shallow-water-good-safety-record-less-risky. 
87 Campbell Robertson & Clifford Krauss, Gulf Spill Is the Largest of Its Kind, Scientists 
Say, N.Y. Times, Aug. 3, 2010, at A14. 
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initial hypotheses.”88 While individuals are of course subject to this 
same bias, it may become exacerbated in groups due to the group po-
larization phenomena described above.89 Thus, “[e]ven when some 
group members may be aware of information that undermines a 
group’s initially preferred decision, the group may fail to consider the 
information to the same extent as it would consider confirming infor-
mation.”90 The initial hypothesis of most decision makers, both within 
industry and the agency, would have been that deepwater drilling was 
safe, technological safeguards were reliable, and oil spill response ca-
pabilities were robust.91 In such a climate, it comes as no surprise that 
contrary information never made it into any environmental review. 
 The important insight of the group pathologies approach, though, 
is that the lack of regard for environment risk may not have been the 
result of any evil or calculating motive.92 Instead, it may have stemmed 
from a genuine—if flawed—belief that such risks were low, and that 
even if a blowout occurred, technological safeguards would prevent 
catastrophe.93 The specific warnings of the inadequacy of existing tech-
nology would have been either brushed aside as the product of igno-
rant outsiders, or overly zealous engineers, or simply not known within 
the relatively insulated groups making key decisions.94 This phenome-
non may have been exacerbated by leadership bias and by the pressure 
to perform environmental reviews quickly.95 Interestingly, the tiered 
nature of environmental reviews—where an EIS was performed at the 
programmatic level, only an EA at the lease level, and nothing formal at 
all at the drilling level—may have made it easier for decision makers at 
the lower levels to ignore warnings by assuring themselves that proper 
reviews were done at the higher levels.96 In this sense, the tiers may 
have functioned as a ready excuse to ignore information such as envi-
ronmental risks that may have challenged the dominant ideology of the 
group. The group could always tell itself that such risks were already 
                                                                                                                      
88 See Seidenfeld, supra note 50, at 538. 
89 See Schulz-Hardt, supra note 46, at 665. 
90 See Seidenfeld, supra note 50, at 538. 
91 See Nat’l Comm’n on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore 
Drilling, Deep Water: The Gulf Oil Disaster and the Future of Offshore Drilling 
294 (2011) [hereinafter BP Commission Report]. 
92 See id. at 52. 
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Disaster and Why We Won’t, 38 B.C. Envtl. Aff. L. Rev. 279, 289 (2011). 
94 See id. 
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considered, further insulating itself from any contemplation of catas-
trophe. 
III. A Ruthless Calculation/Capture Account  
of Regulatory Failure 
 Of course there is another possible explanation for the flawed en-
vironmental reviews that occurred before the spill. Put simply, BP may 
not have been honestly blinded to the risk. Instead, it may have ration-
ally, if ruthlessly, calculated the relative costs and benefits of doing 
nothing, rather than taking proactive steps to protect against risk, and 
determined the former was the better value choice. Pursuant to such a 
rational calculation, BP simply co-opted MMS with its strategy of down-
playing environmental risks.97 
 To address the risk of a blowout protector failure before a spill, BP 
would have had to expend money, perhaps a good deal of it.98 If BP 
had understood the risk to be relatively immediate and quite large, 
then it might well have decided that the investment of resources in pre-
vention now would be justified on a cost-benefit basis. We doubt that 
was BP’s understanding. But imagine that BP actually understood that 
there was some non-negligible risk of a blowout, albeit a risk such that a 
spill was very unlikely and almost impossible to quantify. We maintain 
that it is possible to understand BP’s decision to ignore a perceived 
modest, but non-negligible risk of a major spill as perfectly rational 
from a corporate wealth maximization perspective.99 
 How could that be a rational calculation? For one thing, the lesson 
for the oil industry—and not just the oil industry—from the Exxon-
Valdez, the pre-BP biggest spill in United States history, arguably is that 
causing a major environmental and economic disaster is not necessarily 
the end of the world for a powerful company.100 In the wake of the 
Exxon-Valdez spill, Exxon has ferociously and quite successfully liti-
gated the issue of its liability and in particular its liability for punitive 
damages.101 At the same time, Exxon managed to secure an an-
                                                                                                                      
 
97 See Flournoy, supra note 93, at 284. 
98 See BP Commission Report, supra note 91, at 51–52, 55. 
99 See Michael C. Jensen, Value Maximization, Stakeholder Theory, and the Corporate Objec-
tive Function, 12 Bus. Ethics Q. 235, 236, 239 (2002). 
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nouncement by the federal government that the spill cleanup had been 
completed by 1992, even though by many accounts much of the oil was 
never recovered, and ecological effects continue to be felt to this day.102 
In the immediate wake of Exxon-Valdez and up until the present day, 
Exxon has continued to be a fantastically profitable company.103 
 The legal environment in which BP and other companies operate 
also makes intentional inaction in the face of non-negligible risk a ra-
tional strategy. Ex ante, before the spill, a rationally calculating BP 
would have understood that U.S. corporate, bankruptcy, and tort law 
would operate to allow the company to cap any liability exposure from 
any major spill. A rationally calculating BP would have known that, by 
building and operating the well in tandem with other companies, it 
would share liability for a spill under applicable tort law principles.104 
By operating the well via a subsidiary, a rationally calculating BP would 
have known that it effectively capped its liability because prevailing 
corporate law principles make it exceedingly difficult to pierce the veil 
and collect from the parent company.105 And BP, again in the rational 
calculator model, also would have considered that the threat of Chap-
ter 11 bankruptcy of the subsidiary in the event of a spill would dis-
suade the government and other actors from pressing their claims too 
aggressively.106 A rationally calculating BP also would have understood 
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that—the risk of bankruptcy aside—the central importance of the 
company for the local Gulf and U.S. economy would be a strong disin-
centive for the federal or state governments to punish the company 
enough to harm its ability to operate effectively in the United States.107 
And a rationally calculating BP would also have understood that any 
costly regulatory reforms adopted in the wake of a spill likely would be 
borne by BP and its competitors alike, so that its competitive posture 
would not be changed vis-à-vis its competitors.108 
 What has happened since the Deepwater Horizon blowout protec-
tor failed, moreover, would seem to confirm that a deliberative strategy 
of doing nothing proactive in the face of a perceived non-negligible risk 
would have been, ex ante, quite rational. For its part, the U.S. govern-
ment appears poised not to take punitive actions against BP and, quite 
to the contrary, has allegedly downplayed the magnitude and effects of 
the spill—all of which is to BP’s advantage.109 The House bill that was 
passed and would impose new restrictions on BP as well as other com-
panies in the Gulf is stalled, perhaps permanently, in the Senate.110 
Shortly after announcing a federal moratorium on deepwater drilling, 
the federal government lifted the moratorium for all drilling companies 
in the Gulf.111 While BP has been harshly criticized by some in the Gulf, 
local leaders and residents have been adamant in their desire to see BP, 
and the other companies, continue to expand drilling there.112 
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 The rational, ruthless calculator story of how BP and the other 
companies failed to plan for the possibility of a failure of a blowout 
preventer, of course, only makes sense because government regulators 
did not force the companies to address that possibility. This regulatory 
failure could be attributed to groupthink at MMS and elsewhere, as 
suggested above: key regulators, if not the top management of the 
companies, may simply have bought in and held onto as orthodoxy the 
oil companies’ narrative that blowout protectors simply do not fail and 
hence no meaningful contingency planning was needed. But it is also 
possible that key regulators did not absorb this narrative and hence all 
else being equal may have wanted the companies to take more action, 
but they were too overwhelmed by corporate influence to take any ef-
fective action in this regard. The agencies were captured because of: 
(1) the political power of oil companies in Congress and the executive 
branch, due to campaign contributions and other support; (2) the 
agency staff’s desire to please the companies and secure possible per-
sonal benefits; and (3) good relations with the companies, which could 
be seen as a road to success, both within the agency and in the private 
sector.113 The capture story is not exclusive of the agency groupthink 
one: a dominant corporate narrative about the infallibility of blowout 
protectors may have been adopted by the relevant agencies, and this 
group mindset plus the raw power and possible benefits offered by and 
possible retribution from the companies may have operated in tandem 
to quiet any voices within the agencies who might have effectively 
pushed for tougher agency actions requiring proactive and precaution-
ary planning on the part of the companies. 
IV. Reforming NEPA to Address Group Pathologies, Ruthless 
Calculation, and Capture 
 If the failure of environmental reviews was due to either group pa-
thologies, namely groupthink encompassing the agency and industry 
actors, or industry’s ruthless calculation coupled with agency capture, 
then most of the reforms being called for in the environmental review 
process will do nothing to prevent similar failures in the future.114 The 
Council of Environmental Quality (CEQ), for example, has called for 
greater coordination among successive reviews in the environmental re-
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view process of the leasing, exploration, and drilling in offshore areas.115 
The CEQ—and not just the CEQ—has called for a reconsideration, and 
perhaps limitation, on the use of the grants of categorical exclusions to 
otherwise applicable review requirements.116 Greater coordination and 
fewer or no categorical exclusions are completely unobjectionable re-
forms, and they are responsive to the failures of MMS.117 But if the group 
pathology or ruthless calculator/capture accounts are descriptively cor-
rect, these proposed reforms will not ensure that industry takes greater 
precautions to prevent and prepare for the contingency of ecological 
disasters. 
 If group pathology is in play, more coordination among successive 
reviews, and a greater number of reviews due to fewer categorical ex-
clusions will not result in stronger preventative measures and contin-
gency planning. That is because there will not be strong voices within 
the agency or industry to push for more prevention and contingency 
planning. And if drafts of the reviews do contain such calls, top agency 
officials, immersed in a group pathology, are likely to alter those drafts 
or ignore them, thus allowing industry to ignore them as well.118 If we 
assume instead that industry is a highly realistic but ruthlessly calculat-
ing entity and that agencies are captured, we likewise would expect bet-
ter coordinated and more reviews to translate into higher transactions 
costs, such as longer federal register notices, but not to change industry 
behavior. And the same is true of calls to reform NEPA by reinstituting 
worst-case scenario requirements for EISs, however sound those calls 
may be.119 Such a requirement will not meaningfully change the sub-
stance of EISs, agency requirements, and industry behavior when 
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groupthink or ruthless calculation/capture describes the mindset of 
agency and industry actors.120 
 Changes in formal NEPA requirements, however, could perhaps 
have a real impact when bolstered by enforcement via citizen suits.121 
However, the national environmental non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs)—the groups that are best able to mount effective litigation— 
essentially ignored the Gulf region before the BP oil spill.122 Putting 
aside the perhaps temporary attention these groups are paying to the 
Gulf in the wake of the BP spill, government regulators and industry 
can engage in natural resource extraction in significant swathes of the 
nation without much fear of a well-litigated NEPA suit or of local politi-
cians being embarrassed or galvanized by any such suit that is 
brought.123 Moreover, the federal judiciary has been notably hostile to 
NEPA litigation, particularly in recent years, and, as Dan Farber has 
pointed out, often has given agencies a pass on environmental reviews 
that ignore the most obvious and potentially most dangerous risk from 
the proposed agency action.124 It would be reasonable for the national 
environmental NGOs to anticipate a particularly cool judicial reception 
in those regions like the Gulf States, moreover, where the environmental 
groups are not strong in membership, do not have much influence 
among local politicians, and where extractive industries form a center-
piece of the local economy. 
 If better NEPA-style review, and more coordination of that review, 
is unlikely to have an effect where the groupthink or ruthless calculator 
accounts are applicable, and NGOs and the courts cannot be relied 
upon to play a constructive role, then what reforms would make a dif-
ference? We suggest that to make a difference, the environmental re-
view has to be re-conceptualized. In the dominant NEPA model, the 
review is undertaken by the “action agency,” which was MMS in the 
Gulf context, often with required consultation by expert federal agen-
cies, such as Department of Interior’s Fish and Wildlife Service.125 Even 
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if the industry actor, such as BP, in fact does much of the work and even 
writes the review, the review carries the action agency’s name and it is 
that agency that bears the risk of being sued or criticized for its inade-
quacies.126 In some instances, agencies such as MMS may have other 
regulatory review requirements that oblige a permit applicant or other 
private actor to conduct an environmental review that is formally sepa-
rate from the NEPA process.127 Even where this is so, the consequences 
of not conducting the review, or conducting it poorly, are minimal for 
the industry actor if the agency in fact is absorbed in a complacency-
inspiring groupthink or has been captured.128 BP and the other oil 
companies could prepare oil spill response plans in 2009 that refer-
enced walruses in the Gulf—even though none have been there for 
centuries—because they knew it did not matter.129 Nothing was at stake. 
 Now imagine that we re-conceptualize NEPA and related environ-
mental reviews in two important respects. First, instead of being seen as 
a process or requirement that the agency manages and takes legal re-
sponsibility for, the NEPA process would be openly recognized as an 
undertaking of the company seeking the award of a lease or other 
benefit from the government agency. BP and other companies would 
have to fully own their reviews, and the lack of quality or comprehen-
siveness in them. Second, rather than being seen as having no down-
side consequences, at least in the absence of a citizen suit, the envi-
ronmental review would have potentially serious consequences for the 
company’s bottom line; companies could be severely penalized finan-
cially for having conducted a dishonest or grossly inadequate environ-
mental review as part of the process of obtaining the lease, exploration 
plan approval, or permission to drill. Imagine, in particular, a scheme 
in which a company such as BP would be required to conduct and pub-
lish an environmental review at the time of leasing, exploration, and 
drilling, and then its rights to retain any leases, exploration plan ap-
provals, or drilling permissions would be tied to the quality of the envi-
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ronmental review it submitted to the agency. The company also would 
have a duty to update its reviews, in the same way that agencies have a 
duty now to update their reviews under NEPA when new information 
comes to light.130 If it were later discovered that the company’s envi-
ronmental review was conducted in a dishonest or grossly inadequate 
way, the lease, approval, or permission could be rescinded without the 
payment of any compensation.131 In the case of a rescinded lease, the 
government would then be free to re-lease the relevant tract. In the 
case of a rescinded exploration plan approval or drilling plan permis-
sion, the lease would remain in place but the lessee would need to re-
start the process of obtaining the required approval, including the 
completion of an updated, adequate environmental review. In practice, 
rescissions of approvals of this sort would translate into real delays in 
resource extraction, and hence significant foregone revenue. 
 We label our re-conceptualization NEPA-as-contract because it 
would transform the NEPA environmental review process into a con-
tractual bargain where the industry actor offers a realistic, thorough 
environmental review—including mitigation planning—as considera-
tion for the receipt of the lease or government permission. From a con-
tractual perspective, it is only right that industry should lose its benefit 
from the bargain if it is found out that it provided illusory considera-
tion.132 One analogy is a contract for insurance coverage. When an in-
dividual applies for insurance, the insurance company requires the dis-
closure of certain information.133 If an individual fails to provide the 
correct information, and the company subsequently learns that is the 
case, the company can treat the policy as rescinded and then deny any 
                                                                                                                      
130 See 40 C.F.R. § 1502.9(c) (2010) (requiring agencies to prepare supplemental EISs, if 
“[t]here are significant new circumstances or information relevant to environmental con-
cerns and bearing on the proposed action or its impacts”); Council on Envtl. Quality, A 
Citizen’s Guide to the NEPA: Having Your Voice Heard 20 (2007), available at 
http://ceq.hss.doe.gov/nepa/Citizens_Guide_Dec07.pdf. 
131 See Mobil Oil Exploration & Producing Se. v. United States, 530 U.S. 604, 607 
(2000). In Mobil Oil, the Supreme Court embraced a contractual understanding of regula-
tion, where one party must meet its obligation or compensate the other if it does not—
although, to date, it has done so to the benefit of regulated industries. See id.; United States 
v. Winstar Corp., 518 U.S. 839, 895 (1996) (holding that bank regulators must compensate 
the regulated entity when regulators broke their promises regarding regulatory treatment 
of the bank). See generally David Dana & Susan P. Koniak, Bargaining in the Shadow of Democ-
racy, 148 U. Pa. L. Rev. 473 (1999) (assessing the Court’s embrace of a contract model of 
regulation). 
132 See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 77 (1981). 
133 Jeffrey W. Stempel, Stempel on Insurance Contracts § 3.07[E] (3d ed. 2010). 
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claims under the policy.134 More broadly, contracts of all sorts may be 
treated as rescinded by one party if it is discovered that the other party 
to the contract made material misstatements at the time the contract 
was formed.135 For example, the seller of property implicitly warrants 
that it has good title and if it is later found that it does not, the buyer 
can elect to treat the purchase contract as rescinded.136 
 For this NEPA-as-contract approach to work, there would need to 
be some protections against overreaching, as well as protections against 
the agencies simply sitting on their rights to rescind. To those ends, an 
agency would be required to make formal findings that an environ-
mental review by the company was grossly inadequate and/or dishon-
est, and those findings would be subject to judicial review. At the same 
time, citizens potentially affected by the environmental risks that had 
come to light since the environmental review was performed could sue 
to challenge the agency’s failure to exercise its rescission rights. We 
think such suits might be brought even in venues where traditional 
NEPA suits currently are not pursued, because they almost always would 
follow an “accident” or public disclosure that draws public attention 
and provides a strong basis for showing that the environmental review 
could not have been completed in good faith and with reasonable dili-
gence. Note, however, that in the case of an accident such as a spill in-
volving a single company in a particular area, our proposed regime 
could easily result in a re-examination by the agency of all the envi-
ronmental reviews by all the companies that operate in that area, as has 
indeed happened with respect to reviews and disclosures involving all 
the oil companies operating in the Gulf in the wake of the BP spill.137 
Thus, any single company would know that the quality and comprehen-
siveness of its environmental review and mitigation planning could be 
called into question with potentially disastrous financial consequences 
if any of the operators in the relevant area experienced a major acci-
                                                                                                                      
134 Pinette v. Assurance Co. of Am., 52 F.3d 407, 409 (2d Cir. 1995) (discussing state 
law grounds for insurance companies to deny converge); Stempel, supra note 133, 
§ 3.07[E]. 
135 Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 164. 
136 See id. 
137 See Reorganization and Regulatory Reform, Bureau Ocean Energy Mgmt., Regula-
tion & Enforcement, http://www.boemre.gov/ReorganizationRegulatoryReform.htm 
(last visited Apr. 15, 2011) (“In response to the Deepwater Horizon explosion and result-
ing oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico, the Obama Administration launched the most aggres-
sive and comprehensive reforms to offshore oil and gas regulation and oversight in U.S. 
history.”). 
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dent or was otherwise exposed as causing environmental harm or being 
unprepared to prevent or remediate environmental harm.138 
 The NEPA-as-contract reform we propose speaks directly to our 
rational, ruthless calculator account of why BP never prepared for the 
possibility of a blowout protector failure.139 A rationally calculating BP 
would consider the expected costs of not acting against risk to be more 
significant if a strategy of silence and inaction could result in losing 
very valuable lease rights or exploration and drilling permissions. In-
deed, from a rational calculation perspective, under our regime a com-
pany like BP would want to invest resources in environmental review 
and mitigation in proportion to how productive it estimated the field 
or other resource to be. In other words, the more expected oil, the 
more environmental review and thorough consideration of mitigation. 
Because, all else being equal, the productivity of a field will correlate 
with its potential for causing environmental harm, we think our pro-
posal would create exactly the right incentives. Of course, it is true that 
a company like BP might believe that it could exercise its influence 
over an agency enough to forestall the agency from making the finding 
that would lead to rescission of a lease or other permission. But the 
even a modest possibility that the company could not avoid rescission 
would change its ex ante calculations about how much to invest in envi-
ronmental review and mitigation planning. Indeed, we think that heavy 
industry influence over agencies is a reality that should make our pro-
posal more palatable because it goes a distance toward ensuring that 
agencies will not fall sway to hindsight bias and seek rescission of leases 
and other permissions based on the failure of company reviews to con-
sider risks and alternatives, which could not reasonably have been an-
ticipated before an accident or other occurrence brought new informa-
tion to light.140 
 We think the NEPA-as-contract reform also speaks to the group 
pathologies account of why BP and others did not plan for a failure of 
blowout protectors. By making the NEPA process one that has poten-
tially very important implications for the company’s valuable legal 
                                                                                                                      
138 We think that because of this dynamic, companies actually might come to welcome 
more stringent industry-wide regulatory requirements and more meaningful government 
review of company environmental assessments, because tougher government action might 
be seen as the best way to protect against rescission threats emanating from accidents or 
bad practices of one’s competitors. 
139 See discussion supra Part III. 
140 See generally Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, A Positive Psychological Theory of Judging in Hindsight, 
65 U. Chi. L. Rev. 571, 576–86 (1998) (explaining and discussing the possible reasons for 
hindsight bias). 
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rights in resource extraction, NEPA-as-contract would change corpora-
tions’ internal dynamic surrounding environmental review. Environ-
mental review could no longer be seen as simply an obstacle, chore, or 
tedium to get through; it would have to be seen as something that the 
company had a financial stake in getting right, even if the company 
knew that the agency would accept whatever it submitted. Top man-
agement, in-house counsel, and very likely outside counsel would take a 
closer look at reviews than they currently do, and would want to assure 
themselves that they “covered the bases” by calling on company staff to 
identify any arguable holes or weaknesses that could later, perhaps 
years later, be used to challenge the company’s legal rights in resource 
extraction. 
 In this way, the NEPA-as-contract model would counteract the pro-
drilling leadership bias that likely contributed to the groupthink dy-
namic.141 Company leaders would now have a strong incentive to 
change the culture in which the engineers always dominate the biolo-
gists and cautions about drilling are routinely dismissed.142 Much like 
construction companies have used a safety first culture to reduce job-
site accidents, oil companies would have a powerful incentive to im-
plement a culture that takes a hard look at potential environmental 
harms.143 Indeed, if this cultural shift were strong enough, group po-
larization effects might shift to emphasize safety and harm-mitigation 
much more strongly than simple regulation would predict. Similarly, 
group confirmation bias may shift from emphasizing that “everyone 
knows drilling is safe” to “everyone knows you’ve got to fully assess the 
risks.” As the literature on so-called “norm cascades” has made clear, 
once a given norm becomes adopted by a sufficient number of actors, 
it may reach a tipping point, after which it becomes rapidly diffused.144 
Government agencies, with their strong symbiotic relationship with in-
dustry, would likely not be immune from these new norms, but even if 
they somehow managed to be, industry caution alone would likely be 
sufficient to improve the level of environmental review. 
                                                                                                                      
141 See supra notes 70–74 and accompanying text. 
142 See Eilperin, supra note 35. 
143 See Change in Safety Culture at Pepper Construction Group Leads to Dramatic Decline in Inju-
ries and Illnesses, Occupational Safety & Health Admin., http://www.osha.gov/dcsp/ 
success_stories/compliance_assistance/ss_peppercon.html (last visited Apr. 15, 2011). 
144 See, e.g., Martha Finnemore & Kathryn Sikkink, International Norm Dynamics and Po-
litical Change, 52 Int’l Org. 887, 892–93 (1998) (explaining how group agreement on a 
norm may become widespread). 
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 Even if groupthink continued to dominate the company, and such 
groupthink dismissed a spill or other disaster as essentially unthinkable, 
the NEPA-as-contract reform would give permission, or if you will, 
cover, to potentially dissenting voices within companies. Indeed, such 
dissenting voices could acknowledge that the groupthink was the “right 
think” and still argue that protection had to be taken because of other 
companies’ possible “human” errors. Specifically, dissenting voices 
could point to the legal and financial risk from another company’s er-
ror, and from the relevant agency overreaching by punishing not just 
that company but all the companies with rescission based on a claim 
that past environmental reviews were grossly inadequate or dishonest. 
In this way, even if NEPA-as-contract did not overcome groupthink di-
rectly, it would sharply mitigate its impact on decision-making. 
 Finally, one of the advantages of this approach is that it would be 
easy to implement. No new agencies would be needed. No new compli-
cated regulations would be necessary. The rescission clause could simply 
be inserted into leases, permits, and permissions.145 If a federal statute 
were required to enable agencies to do just that, or to authorize citizen 
suits for agencies’ failures to rescind, the bill could be very brief. That 
Congress would seem very unlikely to pass such a bill, we readily admit. 
But a proposal can have substantive merit as a policy solution even if the 
road from its articulation to its political adoption is hard to envision. 
 We note that the linkage we advocate—between opportunities to 
lease, explore, and drill, and environmental disclosure and planning— 
could be achieved by means other than rescissions. For example, com-
panies that were found to have performed dishonest or grossly inade-
quate environmental reviews with respect to existing leases could be 
barred from obtaining new leases for a period of time. Or perhaps they 
could not be barred but would be subject to a harsher royalty sched-
ule.146 But we think that there is a legal coherence and even elegance 
in treating companies engaged in NEPA and other reviews the same as 
other breaching parties when they are found to have not performed 
their end of the deal—namely, rescinding their contracts and their 
rights under the contracts.147 The United States government is held to 
                                                                                                                      
145 See 43 U.S.C. § 1337(o) (2006). Indeed, the Energy Policy Act of 2005, which gov-
erns leasing in the Gulf, suggests a contract rescission approach. See id. (explaining that 
“[t]he Secretary may cancel any lease obtained by fraud or misrepresentation”). 
146 See Jody Freeman, The Good Driller Award, N.Y. Times, July 1, 2010, at A31 (suggest-
ing that companies could receive preferred royalty rates for good environmental perform-
ance as “carrots”). 
147 See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 235 (1981). 
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commitments made to private actors as part of the regulatory process 
under the general reasoning of contract law.148 There is good reason 
that, likewise, companies should be asked to meet the commitments 
and back the representations they make as part of the regulatory proc-
ess, and then to be subject to the contract remedy of rescission if they 
fail to do so. 
Conclusion 
 There are two plausible accounts for the failure of environmental 
reviews to contemplate, let alone plan for, the sort of disaster that 
struck the Gulf of Mexico on April 20, 2010. The first is that agency and 
industry personnel, subject to a groupthink assumption concerning 
risk, honestly believed that such a spill was highly unlikely and that ex-
isting technology was more than adequate to deal with it.149 The second 
is that industry, pursuant to a rational calculation, assumed that it could 
externalize much of the cost of any such spill, and prevented MMS 
from contemplating or planning for it through various mechanisms of 
agency capture.150 In either case, what was missing was a powerful in-
centive to conduct good environmental reviews.151 We believe that ex-
isting calls to reform NEPA are insufficient to provide such an incen-
tive, and thus call for re-conceptualizing the law along the lines of an 
insurance model. Under such a model, industry would be subject to 
losing the benefit of its bargain if environmental reviews are found to 
be inadequate. Importantly, implementing such a reform would not 
require congressional action but could simply be written into leasing 
and other contracts going
 
148 See United States v. Winstar Corp., 518 U.S. 839, 895 (1996) (broadly holding that 
regulators can bind the United States contractually to promises they make with regulated 
entities). For a critique of Winstar as applying a private contract model to public govern-
ance to an extensive degree, see David Dana & Susan P. Koniak, supra note 131, at 555. 
149 See supra notes 80–86 and accompanying text. 
150 See supra Part III. 
151 See supra notes 113–120 and accompanying text. 
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